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The Thesis of Norm Transformation in the Theory of Mass Atrocity
Paul Morrow
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Abstract: Theoretical accounts of genocide and mass atrocity commonly embrace the thesis of norm
transformation. This thesis holds, first, that individual and institutional participation in such crimes is at
least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. It holds,
second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires changing norms that currently guide the
actions of particular individual and institutional actors. This paper clarifies, defends, and extends the thesis
of norm transformation. It clarifies this thesis by providing a general account of the nature and dynamics of
norms. It defends this thesis against charges of circularity and against the claim that norms are not, in fact,
fundamental guides to action. Finally, it extends this thesis by arguing that changes in norms before, during,
and after mass atrocities count among the considerations that ought to be included in assessments of legal
and moral accountability for such crimes.
Keywords: norm inversion, mass atrocity, genocide prevention, legal accountability, moral accountability,
extremely violent societies
Theoretical accounts of genocide and mass atrocity commonly embrace some version of the
thesis of norm transformation. This thesis holds, first, that individual and institutional participation
in such crimes is at least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social
and political life. It holds, second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires
changing norms that currently guide the actions of particular individual and institutional actors.
Taken together, these two claims put the thesis of norm transformation at the center of ongoing
efforts to explain and prevent genocide and mass atrocity.
Despite widespread acceptance of the thesis of norm transformation, there is no scholarly
consensus concerning the nature or dynamics of norms. Political scientists and historians,
sociologists and legal scholars all operate with distinct conceptions of norms, rarely considering
whether those conceptions meet the needs of researchers approaching genocide and mass atrocity
from alternative disciplinary perspectives. This conceptual variation has impeded critical reflection
on the thesis of norm transformation, and has allowed important challenges to this thesis to go
unaddressed.
This paper clarifies, defends, and extends the thesis of norm transformation. It clarifies this
thesis by offering a general account of norms and norm dynamics, and by showing how this account
can enrich existing explanatory and preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation. It
defends this thesis against a number of theoretical and practical challenges—including challenges
to the power of this thesis to help explain historical mass atrocities, and challenges to the efficacy
of proposed preventive changes in norms. Finally, it extends this thesis by arguing for a third,
evaluative claim, namely, that changes in norms before, during, and after mass atrocities count
among the considerations that ought to be included in assessments of legal and moral accountability
for such crimes.
In proposing this extension of the thesis of norm transformation, this paper posits a fundamental
continuity between explanatory, preventive, and evaluative applications of this thesis. The paper
thus breaks with much recent scholarship on genocide and mass atrocity, within which these
different aims appear either unrelated or at odds.1 At the same time, the paper acknowledges key
criticisms of existing modes of assessing legal accountability for mass violence. Those criticisms
help structure the discussion of the evaluative implications of the thesis of norm transformation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section One uses a case drawn from the annals of National
Socialist medical practice as the starting point for a general discussion of norms and norm dynamics.
Norms are defined in terms of three features: their acceptance, their particularity, and their action-
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guiding power. Different types of norm transformations are then distinguished, including norm
inversion, norm breakdown, and norm emergence.
Section Two examines in more detail existing explanatory and preventive applications of
the thesis of norm transformation. Applications of both types, it is argued, rely on three basic
theoretical assumptions. The first assumption is that it is possible to reliably identify differences
in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments in time.
The second assumption is that norms have a fundamental, or non-reducible, power to guide the
actions of individuals and thereby pattern the conduct of groups. The third assumption is that it
is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms by which particular changes in norms have been, or
might be, achieved.
Section Three addresses two significant challenges to current explanatory and preventive
applications of the thesis of norm transformation. These challenges – termed the circularity
challenge and the norm-reducibility challenge – target the first two theoretical assumptions about
norm dynamics mentioned above. In response to these challenges, the paper first argues that
testimony, broadly construed, offers a source of non-circular evidence concerning historical norm
transformations. The paper then distinguishes between identity-instituting and identity-vindicating
norm transformations, and uses this distinction to defuse the second, norm-reducibility challenge.
Section Four turns, finally, to the evaluative extension of the thesis of norm transformation.
The section frames this extension in terms of the localization of moral and legal responsibility
for transformations in norms that contribute to mass atrocity. The section first argues that it is
legitimate to localize—i.e. restrict to some subset of a larger set of qualified parties—attributions of
moral responsibility for norm transformation in cases where specific mechanisms for transforming
norms can be identified, and where those changes in norms have had a demonstrable effect on the
precipitation or prolongation of large-scale wrongs. The section then argues that in cases of societywide norm breakdown, as may be found in so-called “extremely violent societies,” localization of
legal responsibility for mass violence faces a higher justificatory burden, for both historiographical
and properly juridical reasons.
Norms: Definition and Dynamics
On 11 September 1940, Dr. Leonardo Conti of the Reich Interior Ministry addressed a letter to
his former medical school teacher, Professor Gottfried Ewald. Conti’s letter was occasioned by
Ewald’s critical evaluation and rejection of the secret Nazi euthanasia program, Aktion T4.2 The text
of Conti’s letter reads as follows:
Dear Professor Ewald,
With the deepest gratitude I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 21 August. I still
remember with great pleasure your lectures in Erlangen.
Your analysis contains much that is right, I’m sure. Nevertheless, I take a different view,
although I cannot and will not set it down in writing at this time. I would only like to say, that
I am fully convinced that the opinions of the entire German Volk concerning these things are
undergoing a transformation, and I can very easily imagine that things which in one period are
considered objectionable [verwerflich] can in the next period come to be regarded as the only
right choice. This is something we have experienced countless times in the course of history.
As the most recent example I would gently point to the sterilization law: here the process of a
transformation in thought [Umformung des Denkens] is today already quite far advanced.3

Conti’s letter has commonly been cited as evidence of professional complicity in the Holocaust.4
The letter is of interest here because of the remarkable historical articulation it offers of the
thesis of norm transformation. Conti’s letter contemplates transformations in two long-standing
prohibitions within the medical profession: a prohibition on intentional medical killing and a
prohibition on involuntary sterilization. In order to better understand these claims, we must first
clarify the definition of norms.
Defining Norms
This paper proposes the following general definition of norms:
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Norms are practical prescriptions, permissions, or prohibitions, accepted by members of
particular groups, organizations, or societies, and capable of guiding the actions of those
individuals.

Several features of this definition demand elaboration. First, it is necessary to explain what
“acceptance” of a norm entails. Second, it is necessary to explain the significance of the particularity,
or domain-limitedness, of norms. Third, it is necessary to explain what it means for norms to guide
actions, and in what ways this can occur.
In the first place, norms are accepted by individuals. This is the basis of the socio-empirical
quality of norms—i.e. their status as social facts that can be studied via standard procedures
of historical and social scientific inquiry.5 Philosophical accounts of norm acceptance vary
considerably; this paper will not seek to defend any single one of them.6 What is crucial is that any
adequate account must accommodate a range of different types of norm acceptance, extending
from relatively formal and explicit acts of acceptance (as in the case of professional oaths,
university honor codes, and so on) to relatively informal or implicit forms of norm acceptance
(as in the case of norms governing fair dealing in monetary transactions or gift giving).7 This
paper is committed, furthermore, to two specific claims about norm acceptance. First, there is a
substantive difference between following a norm merely in order to avoid sanctions imposed on
infractions, and following a norm in order to sustain or satisfy properly normative attitudes (such
as obligation; felt-bindingness, and so on). That difference may constitute, and at least tracks, the
difference between merely conforming with and actually accepting a norm.8 Second, although it
may be the case that all norms are, in principle, linguistically expressible, it is not necessarily the
case that every individual who accepts a certain norm must be able to give a clear verbal account
of that norm’s requirements.9
In the second place, norms are domain-limited. They circulate within particular groups,
organizations, and societies. This feature of norms explains the significant role that norms play in
sustaining shared identities within particular groups, organizations, or societies.10 It is also crucial
to efforts by historians and social scientists to use norms to explain patterns of collective, rather than
merely individual, behavior.11 To be sure, the bounds of the collectivities within which particular
norms circulate are rarely static. The discussion of norm dynamics below aims to account for some
of the many ways in which those bounds can change.
Finally, norms have the power to guide actions. Exactly how norms perform this central, actionguiding function is contested. One problem is to understand the cognitive and conative conditions
under which norms dispose individuals to pursue particular courses of conduct. A second problem
is to establish distinctions among the different types of actions—ranging from compliant to
defiant—that can rightly be said to be guided by a given norm.12 While these difficulties should
not be discounted, the action-guiding power of norms is clearly central to both explanatory and
preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation.13 Importantly, this paper assumes
what I call the priority of the practical point of view. Put simply, this assumption holds that
properly characterizing the contributions of particular norms to the prevention, or precipitation,
of mass atrocities requires considering how those norms contribute to individuals’ first-personal
deliberations over plans and courses of conduct.
How, then, does the definition of norms offered here enrich our understanding of Conti’s
claims concerning the prohibitions on intentional medical killing and involuntary sterilization? It
does so in three ways. First, Conti is asking Ewald to believe that, despite continuing widespread
acceptance of the prohibition on euthanasia within German society, this norm is likely soon
to change substantially. This claim, in turn, rests on an implicit distinction between the norms
accepted by medical professionals such as Conti and by members of society at large. Finally,
Conti appears to be suggesting that his former teacher ought not only to accept the change in the
norms concerning euthanasia, but to act upon it—either in his role as a professor, or as a hospital
administrator, or both.14
Ultimately, the claims set out in Conti’s letter are not just claims about norms, but claims about
transformations in norms. In order to fully understand these claims, it is necessary to turn from the
definition to the dynamics of norms.
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Norm Dynamics
The topic of norm dynamics can be divided into two broad classes of questions. First, there are
questions about the categorization of different types of transformations in norms. Second, there
are questions about the empirical conditions under which norms are more or less likely to undergo
transformations of these several types. The analysis offered in this section focuses on questions of
the first kind. Specifically, it seeks to distinguish between norm inversion, norm breakdown, and
norm emergence.
Norm Inversion

Norm inversions occur when individuals who previously accepted prohibitions on certain
actions come to regard those same actions as required, or vice versa. It is possible, in principle for lone
individuals to experience such radical transformations in normative attitudes and commitments,
without thereby participating in broader group- or society-level inversions. Nevertheless, historical
and social scientific claims about norm inversion typically refer to changes in norms accepted in
the aggregate by members of particular groups, organizations, or societies.15
Conti’s letter to Ewald offers a remarkably apt description of the dynamics of norm inversion.
As Conti writes with respect to the existing prohibition on intentional medical killing: “things
which in one period are considered objectionable can in the next period come to be regarded as
the only right choice.” The last part of this claim makes clear that Conti has in mind not merely
the erosion of a prohibition, but rather a shift from a prohibition to a prescription, or normative
requirement. It is also evident from Conti’s letter that he anticipates not just individual, but grouplevel inversions of norms: first among members of the medical profession, ultimately among “the
entire German Volk.”
Norm Breakdown

Norm breakdowns occur when previously accepted norms cease to guide actions in fact,
and cease to be available as guides to action in principle. These two types of transformation are
logically distinct, but in practice they often occur together.16 When previously prevailing norms
cease to be reflected in the publically observable actions of large numbers of individuals within a
particular group, those norms tend to become less useful as guides to action for other members
of that group. In the accounts of norm breakdown among German professionals under National
Socialism offered by Konrad Jarausch and Berel Lang, just this dynamic is described.17
Like other kinds of norm transformations, breakdowns in norms are generally identified at
the level of groups or populations. However, they cannot be fully understood without considering
the beliefs and actions of individual actors. When norms break down, they lose their power to
guide the decisions and actions of individual actors. This can occur for one of a number of reasons.
Sometimes requisite motivational factors, such as empathy or a sense of fairness, fade. Other times
norms, and the systems of norms to which they belong, become too complicated or convoluted
to guide action. Wartime brutalization offers a reason of the first kind for norm breakdown.18 The
existence of secret or contradictory laws within a repressive state offers a reason of the second
kind.19
Norm Emergence

Norm emergence refers to a range of pathways and processes by which new norms arise
and gain acceptance within particular populations. In this way, norm emergence contrasts with
both norm inversion and norm breakdown – each of which starts from a condition in which a
particular norm is already accepted by individuals belonging to a particular group, organization,
or society.
Conceptual distinctions among different modes of norm emergence have only recently begun
to receive sustained attention from scholars. Political scientists have described cases of grafting of
new norms onto already existing norms, and have emphasized the importance of the work that
norm entrepreneurs do in facilitating norm emergence.20 Philosophers have analyzed phenomena
such as the tendentious introduction of norms, and have modeled non-coercive paths of emergence
for particular cooperation- and coordination-facilitating norms.21

©2015

Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1303

70

Morrow

Perhaps the most interesting trend in the study of norm emergence has been the rapid increase,
over the past decades, in case studies of the development of particular norms in international law
and politics.22 Unlike more general discussions of norm dynamics, many of these case studies
aim to show how the development of specific norms has helped, or might help, to prevent mass
violence. In order to better assess such claims we should turn now to examine in more detail the
thesis of norm transformation.
The Thesis of Norm Transformation
The thesis of norm transformation combines claims about the explanation and the prevention of
large-scale crimes. It holds, first, that individual and institutional participation in such crimes is at
least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life.
It holds, second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires changing norms that
currently guide the actions of particular individual and institutional actors.
Efforts by scholars and policymakers to use the thesis of norm transformation to explain, or
prevent, particular instances of genocide and mass atrocity will be referred to here as applications of
this thesis. This section will analyze several representative explanatory and preventive applications
of the thesis of norm transformation. One aim of this analysis is to show how the general account
of norms and norm dynamics offered above can enrich existing applications of this thesis. Another
aim is to identify the basic theoretical assumptions underlying such applications.
Explanatory Applications
Reflecting on the Rwandan genocide in a 2004 article, political scientist Lee Ann Fujii directly invokes
the thesis of norm transformation. “Put simply,” she writes, “genocidal leaders had to transform
the normative environment [in Rwanda] such that actions that were once considered verboten
(such as killing thy neighbor) could be viewed as not only legitimate but imperative.”23 Fujii offers
a social psychological explanation for why such a transformation in norms should accompany
genocide. “Norms,” she avers, “become more important when reality is confusing, contradictory, or
changing. The more ambiguous the situation, the more likely people are to rely on norms as guides
for behavior; and the clearer the prescription of a given norm, the more likely people will follow
that norm and not others.”24 Throughout her paper, Fujii scans historical records and first-person
accounts for clues to the particular mechanisms by which “genocide became normalized.”25
Fujii’s invocation of the thesis of norm transformation calls attention to three theoretical
assumptions that underlie explanatory applications of this thesis. The first assumption is that it is
possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals
across two or more moments in time. The second assumption is that norms have a fundamental, or
non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and consequently to pattern the conduct
of groups. The third assumption is that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms by which
particular changes in norms have been, or might be, attained.
These three assumptions are not restricted to Fujii’s application of the thesis of norm
transformation. The letter from Dr. Conti discussed above manifests these assumptions. Turning
to a more contemporary, and scholarly, literature, Christopher Browning’s influential analysis of
participation by “ordinary men” in mass killings on the Eastern Front during the Second World
War embodies these assumptions.26
Consider the first assumption identified above. Browning’s study of the members of Reserve
Police Battalion 101, and his reasons for rejecting the idea that racist ideology or wartime
brutalization might help to explain their participation in mass atrocity, are too familiar to require
recapitulation here. What is worth noting is that Browning identifies not one, but two inversions
in norms accepted by members of this particular unit at different moments in time. Browning first
posits an inversion in norms regarding killing prior to participation by members of the Police
Battalion in mass shootings in German-controlled territory in Eastern Europe. He then posits a
second inversion, in fact a reversion, in the decades following WWII. Browning writes:
to concede that the morally inverted world of National Socialism—so at odds with the political
culture and accepted norms of the 1960s—had made perfect sense to them at the time, would

©2015

Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1303

Thesis of Norm Transformation

71

be to admit that they were political and moral eunuchs who simply accommodate to each
successive regime. That was a truth with which few [former members of Reserve Police
Battalion 101] either wanted or were able to come to grips.27

In order to see how the second assumption about norms is implicit in explanatory applications
of the thesis of norm transformation, it is helpful to consider cases of apparent norm breakdown.
Argentinean legal scholar Carlos Santiago Nino offers a helpful example in his discussion of
“institutional anomie” during the Dirty War in his home country. Nino suggests that “judicial
recognition of the legitimacy of coups d’état and the regime’s ensuing laws is perhaps the clearest
example” of such anomie. 28 In helping to legitimate such practices, Nino argues, Argentinean courts
allowed the erosion of crucial rule of law norms such as publicity and consistency in the law.29
Similar claims about breakdowns in norms governing the conduct of legal actors have been made
by scholars of legal institutions under National Socialism.30 In each of these cases, the assumption is
that relevant norms, had they not broken down, could have guided the implicated actors towards
substantially different courses of conduct.
Consider, finally, the assumption that it is possible for scholars to pinpoint specific mechanisms
by which particular changes norms have been, or might be, attained. Here it is appropriate to
return to Fujii’s 2004 analysis of the Rwandan genocide. Fujii identifies three distinct stages in
the emergence of what she calls a “genocidal norm.”31 Each stage is associated with different
mechanisms for provoking norm transformation. First there was a stage of spreading a message of
social division and threats to the Hutu population from Tutsis. Second was a stage of producing
objective evidence of those threats, through staged attacks, killings, and so on. Third was a stage of
making the threats appear imminent, so as to require immediate action.32
Several of the specific mechanisms for norm transformation that Fujii singles out in these several
stages have clear analogues in other historical cases of genocide. These include disseminating hate
propaganda33 and staging “enemy” attacks. Exactly how strong the causal connections between
such acts and subsequent episodes of mass violence are is contested.34 Even where scholars point
to different events as contributing to the inversion, emergence, or breakdown of norms, however,
they share the assumption that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms or processes that
contribute to such transformations.
Preventive Applications
Preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation rest on the same three theoretical
assumptions about norm dynamics as explanatory applications. A representative example comes
from legal scholar Mark Osiel’s 2009 book, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity. After asking how changes
in the law might “help created and cultivate within modern armies the institutional characteristics
enabling them to steer clear of mass atrocity,” Osiel suggests that one strategy might be to introduce
laws imposing civil liabilities on officers whose subordinates take part in atrocities. The imposition
of civil liabilities, Osiel suggests, avoids the problems of procedural justice that comparable
criminal liabilities would encounter.35 At the same time, this change in the law directly counters
existing social norms against “snitching” on fellow members of one’s military unit.36
Osiel’s proposal clearly depends upon the theoretical assumption that it is possible to reliably
identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more
moments in time. In this way this preventive application of the thesis of norm transformation
parallels the explanatory applications discussed above. What is different in this and other preventive
cases is that the first of these two periods of time is defined as the present, and the second as some
point in the future.37
The new norm Osiel advances is aimed primarily at individuals, and is closely tied to concrete
sanctions (in the form of fines) for violations. Neither of these features is essential to preventive
applications of the thesis of norm transformation. To see this, it is useful to turn to the emerging
norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and consider its claims to guide actions.
Unlike Osiel’s proposed legal norm, R2P aims chiefly to guide the actions of states, rather
than single individuals. And unlike Osiel’s proposed norm, R2P aspires to guide actions even
in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. Further clarity comes from distinguishing
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between primary and secondary bearers of responsibilities under R2P. Primary bearers of such
responsibilities are individual states and state leaders. Secondary bearers are the various state and
non-state actors composing the international community, who are tasked with taking up protective
responsibilities when and where primary bearers fail to uphold them.
Crucially, scholars of R2P avoid describing protective actions by secondary bearers as
punishments for failures by primary bearers to fulfill their responsibilities.38 Furthermore, as
Luke Glanville has pointed out, there are currently no legal penalties prescribed for failures by
secondary bearers to act in cases of malfeasance by primary bearers of responsibility.39 What
this example shows is that, while preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation
depend on the assumption that norms have the power to guide actions, both the status of the
actors guided by such norms and the schemes of accountability supporting such guidance can
vary substantially.
Preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation commonly give special attention
to the mechanisms by which desired transformations are to be achieved. In political science, as
noted above, scholars have offered numerous studies of the efforts of norm entrepreneurs to change
norms in order to prevent war and civil conflict.40 In addition to highlighting the accomplishments
of heroic individuals, such studies suggest that particular events in the domestic or international
sphere may serve as catalysts for preventive norm transformations. In each of these cases, authors
assume that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms that have caused, or might in the future
contribute to, preventive transformations in norms.
Two Challenges to the Thesis of Norm Transformation
The previous section surveyed some representative explanatory and preventive applications of the
thesis of norm transformation, and identified three basic theoretical assumptions underlying such
applications. This section will consider challenges to two of those assumptions. The first challenge,
called here the circularity challenge, targets the assumption that it is possible to reliably identify
differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments
in time. The second challenge, called here the norm-reducibility challenge, targets the assumption
that norms have a fundamental, or non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and
thereby pattern the conduct of groups.
The Circularity Challenge
Explanatory applications of the thesis of norm transformation rest in part on the assumption that it
is possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals
across two or more moments in time. The circularity challenge casts doubt on this assumption.
It raises questions about the verifiability of claims about the existence of particular at any given
moment in time. Although charges of circularity can be leveled at claims about the existence of
norms in the present day, such charges are strongest when applied to historical claims about norms
or changes in norms. For this reason, it will here be treated as an historiographical challenge to the
thesis of norm transformation.
Claims about the existence of norms are susceptible to charges of circularity because of the
evidentiary gap that separates the observed conduct of actors – i.e. the actions that individuals
undertake – from the unobservable cognitive and conative states of actors – i.e. the beliefs and
attitudes with which they undertake them. In everyday life it is common to infer information about
relevant beliefs and attitudes from the actions of individuals. But in the case of purportedly normguided conduct, such inferences threaten to produce a circular course of reasoning, in the following
manner. First, observed patterns of behavior are taken as evidence of the existence of norms (and,
by extension, the acceptance of those norms by individuals). Second, these same inferred norms are
relied on to explain, or account for, those observed patterns of behavior.41
Some of the most promising strategies for confirming the existence of norms in present-day
contexts are not available in cases of norms supposed to have existed in the past. Cristina Bicchieri,
a leading theorist of social norms, has pioneered experimental methods for identifying, and
measuring the strength of, such norms in present-day political societies.42 These methods depend
on the experimenters’ ability to control the beliefs subjects have about the types of interactions they
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are involved in, as well as the experimenters’ ability to change the material incentives that subjects
have for certain kinds of behavior. So, in experiments designed to analyze norms of fairness,
subjects may be selectively fed information about the past behavior of their experimental partners;
or they may be told that the experiment has been designed in such a way as to prevent partners
from detecting unfair divisions of monetary rewards.43
Experiments of this kind are clearly not feasible when it comes to the study of norms supposed
to have existed in historical contexts.44 There are, however, other sources, besides the actions of
historical individuals themselves, which can provide evidence of the existence of norms that might
help to explain those actions. Two of the most important of these sources, already much discussed
in the literature on genocide and mass atrocity, are documents and testimony.45
Holocaust scholars have extensively debated the relative merits of documents and testimony
as sources of historical knowledge about this genocide. Leading figures such as Raul Hilberg
and Robert Wolfe have insisted on the primacy of documents created by the National Socialists
themselves as sources of information concerning the plan and execution of their genocidal
policies.46 Such documents do indeed provide evidence of norms, and changes in norms. One
important example concerns the language rules developed by various parties within the military
and political hierarchies to conceal the truth about the policies of deportation and mass killing,
both from the targets of such policies and from third parties. The existence of letters and memos in
which particular officials were reprimanded for failing to conform to such language rules seems to
provide non-circular evidence for the existence of such rules, which, as I have argued elsewhere,
may have taken on the status of social norms. 47
For Hilberg, the evidentiary advantage of documents over testimony was decisive. As Yehuda
Bauer has argued, however, prioritizing documents produced by the authors of the plan of
destruction threatens to distort the historical record in another way, by leaving out large segments
of the experience of the groups and communities occupied or terrorized by the National Socialists
and their allies. Treating testimony as a source of historical knowledge is not unproblematic, Bauer
admits, but it is a mistake to think that historiographical quality is unequivocally improved by
excluding it.48
If testimony is admitted as a source of historical knowledge, then it provides a second route
to overcoming the circularity challenge to claims about the existence of norms in historical
contexts.49 It’s important to be clear as to the bounds, and limits, of this resource. As Bauer points
out, testimony will be most reliable when multiple individuals provide consistent testimony
concerning the existence or influence of a particular fact or event.50 In the context of discussions
of norms, numbers are important in part because it is always possible for single individuals to be
mistaken about what norms are accepted by other individuals in a particular context. An example
may help to illustrate this point. Consider a case reported by the German Jewish academic Victor
Klemperer in his important diaries of daily life in Dresden under National Socialism. In his diary
entry for June 13, 1934, Klemperer shares an anecdote concerning the consequences of boycotts of
Jewish-owned business in three neighboring towns outside Dresden:
In Falkenstein one is not allowed to buy from the “Jew.” And so the people in Falkenstein
travel to the Jew in Auerbach. And the Auerbachers in turn buy from the Falkenstein Jew.
However, on bigger shopping expeditions the people from the one-horse towns travel to
Plauen, where there’s a larger Jewish department store. If you run into someone from the
same town, no one has seen anyone. Tacit convention.51

Do Klemperer’s observations count as evidence of the existence of an emerging rule of behavior
in this region at this period, and if so, what is the strength that evidence? Because this is a diary
entry, rather than a piece of courtroom testimony or an oral reminiscence from well after the fact,
certain kinds of criticisms do not apply. Klemperer’s report could hardly be motivated by a desire
to exculpate himself for some wrongdoing (as courtroom testimony might); nor can this report be
distorted by the clouding effects of time. Nevertheless, it is a genuine question whether Klemperer
was correct in his claims about both the actions, and the intentions, of non-Jewish residents of
these towns, and the evidentiary quality of his claim would be heightened if it were joined by
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testimony from other individuals from the area confirming this point. To gain fully dispositive
evidence of a norm governing this specific practice, it might also be necessary to acquire testimony
regarding certain counter-factual claims, such as the claim that at least some of the shoppers in
this region would have acted in this way even if the instrumental reasons for doing so (i.e. fear of
stigmatization or criticism) were removed.52 To my knowledge, such supplementary testimony
does not exist concerning this particular, highly localized convention. It should, however, be
possible to find multiple testimonies to the existence of other kinds of norms during the Holocaust
and other episodes of genocide and mass atrocity.53 In this way, then, it seems possible to overcome
the circularity challenge to explanatory applications of the thesis of norm transformation using
documents and testimony.
The Norm-Reducibility Challenge
Whereas the circularity challenge targets the assumption that it is possible to reliably identify
differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments
in time, the norm-reducibility challenge targets the assumption that norms have a fundamental, or
non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and consequently to pattern the conduct
of groups. Here I will focus on the argument for norm reduction recently set forth by political
scientist Kristen Renwick Monroe.
In her 2012 book, Ethics in an Age of Terror and Genocide, Monroe aims to show how individuals’
identities, worked out in the context of specific social relationships, constrain the range of choices
available during moral decision-making. 54 Three concepts are crucial to Monroe’s model of moral
choice. First is the concept of identity. Drawing on the findings of social identity theory within
social psychology, Monroe suggests that differences in identity do much to explain the different
actions of perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers in contexts of genocide and mass atrocity. One
of the key claims here is that individuals who conceive of their identity as more extensive, i.e.
as bearing broader connections with other individuals across space and time, are more likely to
perceive threats to the well-being of those others as morally salient, and thus as presenting an
opportunity for moral choice.55
While identity constrains determinations of moral salience, the determinations themselves are
reached through the cognitive process of categorization. Monroe defines this second key concept
as “the process by which ideas and objects are recognized, differentiated, or distinguished from
one another and then understood.”56 Her model construes cognitive categorization as operating in
several distinct stages. First, out of the manifold data of experience, cognitive categorization settles
the particular ways in which particular situations will be framed for particular actors. Particular
modes of framing, in turn, lead to the activation, or suppression, of particular scripts for behavior.
These scripts, finally, count as the proximate causes of observed conduct.57
The third major concept in Monroe’s model of moral choice is that of cognitive stretching. This
concept seeks to capture the fact that patterns of categorization can change over time, in response
to a variety of environmental or social factors. Put differently, cognitive stretching seeks to explain
how situations or events that at one time seem to be morally salient for particular individuals can
subsequently cease to be categorized in this way, or vice-versa.58
Monroe clearly believes that it is possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted
by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments in time. She also clearly believes
it is possible to pinpoint mechanisms by which transformations in norms are brought about—
citing for example Christopher Browning’s account of the effects of isolation, propaganda, and
manipulation on German police officers recruited for mass killings.59 Monroe thus accepts two
of the three theoretical assumptions behind the thesis of norm transformation. Her empirically
grounded model of moral choice challenges the remaining assumption, however, by suggesting
that norms are not fundamental as guides to action.
To the extent that Monroe’s model explicitly addresses the ability of norms to guide decisions
and actions, it suggests that they do so non-reflectively. Her entire account is designed to call into
question moral theories that focus on deliberation and rational reflection on right and wrong action.
Indeed, the central framing device for her study is the idea that both bystanders and resisters of
genocide tend to claim that they had “no choice” in acting or failing to act.60
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A second, and more consequential, feature of Monroe’s model is the claim that the acceptance
of norms often occurs unreflectively, and may be difficult to raise to the level of conscious awareness
or reflection. Monroe argues that an individual’s identity, or self-conception, largely determines
both which facts about the world that individual recognizes as morally salient, and which choices
seem available to that individual in the face of such facts.61
Both of these claims are, in principle, compatible with the thesis of norm transformation,
though they provide a very different picture of both the acceptance of norms and the way in which
norms guide action than has been presented so far in this paper. There is, however, a case to be
made that, on Monroe’s model, norms themselves are not decisive for understanding moral choice
in the context of mass atrocity. Norms are not fundamental to the explanation of individual and
group conduct during large-scale crimes, since both cognitive processes of categorization and,
before this, social processes of identity formation seem to be doing most of the explanatory work.
And norms are not fundamental to the prevention of large-scale crimes, since what really seems
to be important is changing individuals’ self-conceptions, and in this way altering the categories
they deploy and the facts or events that they take to be legally or morally salient.62 This, in my
view, is the strongest statement of the challenge that Monroe’s theory offers to the thesis of norm
transformation.
In responding to this challenge, I will argue that the acceptance of norms is not merely a
consequence of, but also often constitutive of, individual and group identities.63 That is to say,
changes in the set of practical prescriptions, permissions, or prohibitions that one accepts can
serve as conditions for claiming, or maintaining a claim upon, particular identities. Two particular
types of changes in norms are worth distinguishing here. First are identity-instituting norm
transformations. These are changes in norms that serve as conditions for the adoption of new
identities. Second are identity-vindicating norm transformations. These are changes in norms that
serve as conditions for preserving, in the face of some significant threat, existing identities.
How do identity-instituting norm transformations bear on theories of genocide and mass
atrocity? Here again the National Socialist euthanasia program, Aktion T4, is instructive. As Henry
Friedlander has shown, the ideas and ideologies that stood behind the euthanasia program had
existed in Germany (and indeed, in countries outside of Germany, including the United States)
well before the rise of the Nazi movement.64 In terms of changing norms, particularly legal norms,
to reflect these ideas and ideologies, however, it was specifically the political takeover of power
by Hitler that “made the implementation of the race hygiene utopia possible.”65 It is this utopian
aspect of the Nazi policy towards the disabled, emphasized by historian Eric Weitz, that makes it
appropriate to consider the relevant changes in laws regarding so-called “life unworthy of life” as a
form of identity-instituting norm transformation: a change in norms coinciding with, and regarded
at the time as a condition for, the development of a new Völkisch identity.66 Claudia Koonz has
perhaps gone furthest in suggesting that it was identity-instituting changes in norms, rather than
the broader racist or ableist ideologies with which those changes were connected, that distinguished
National Socialist political culture from that of other contemporary political societies.67
Shifting to identity-vindicating norm transformations, it is useful to consider the Nuremberg
Code of medical ethics, promulgated in the first so-called “Successor Trial” at Nuremberg. While
chief prosecutor Telford Taylor considered it possible to “pass very briefly over matters of medical
ethics” in his opening statement at this Doctors’ Trial, retrospective accounts have called the
Nuremberg Code “the most important document in the history of the ethics of medical research.”68
Chiefly at issue in the Nuremberg Code is the requirement that doctors obtain voluntary and
adequately informed consent from prospective research subjects. As historian Paul Weindling has
pointed out, a major aim of the scientists and physicians who assisted Taylor in developing his
prosecutorial strategy was to avoid “too strong a denunciation of Nazi medicine [which] might
jeopardize their own position,” and to articulate “conditions under which risky experimentation
was ethically permissible.”69
The development of the principle of informed consent, on this reading, is an example of an
identity-vindicating norm transformation. It is a norm that had not been clearly articulated, or
broadly accepted, prior to WWII, but which became part of the basis of the continuing legitimacy of
the medical profession after that conflict. Importantly, this change in norms was not so radical as to
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completely disrupt or destroy the existing identity of medical professionals; it allowed physicians
to continue drawing on a tradition of medical experimentation designed to improve future care,
even while suggesting that certain past methods of research were not longer permissible.70
The discussion of identity-instituting and identity-vindicating norm transformations offered
above has shown that norms, and changes in norms, cannot be eliminated from an identity-based
account of moral choice on the basis of the non-fundamentality objection. This finding is significant
for both explanatory and preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation. It also helps
to establish the legitimacy of evaluative applications of the thesis of norm transformation, to which
I now turn.
Extending the Thesis of Norm Transformation
Scholars of genocide and mass atrocity regularly register tensions between efforts to explain,
prevent, and pursue accountability for participation in large-scale crimes.71 Some go further, and
suggest that questions of accountability, or moral and legal responsibility for large-scale crimes,
necessarily conflict with efforts to understand and prevent such crimes, and consequently ought
to be deferred.72
While recognizing the reasons behind these calls for caution, this paper takes a different view.
The thesis of norm transformation establishes a fundamental continuity between explanatory,
preventive, and evaluative approaches to genocide and mass atrocity. If the three basic assumptions
underlying the explanatory and preventive applications of this thesis are indeed tenable—if it is
possible to non-circularly identify changes in norms, if norms play a non-reducible role in guiding
action, and if it is possible to identify specific processes through which norms have been, or might
be, transformed—then it is important to consider the implications for efforts to hold individuals
and groups accountable for participation in large-scale crimes. This section briefly discusses two
such implications. The first concerns strategies for localizing moral responsibility for mass atrocity.
The second concerns obstacles to localizing legal responsibility for such wrongs.
Localization of Moral Responsibility
To localize responsibility for wrongdoing is to restrict attributions of responsibility to some subset of
a larger set of qualified parties. Some ways of localizing responsibility – such as holding executives
responsible for the success or failure of corporations and other institutions—typically strike us as
legitimate. Other ways of localizing responsibility—such as scapegoating in its various guises—
are by definition illegitimate. A key factor in assessing the legitimacy of any proposal to localize
responsibility consists in the degree of effective control that particular individuals exercised, or
were capable of exercising, over the decisions and actions of other individuals.73
This paper proposes the following principle for localizing moral responsibility for mass
atrocities. Where specific mechanisms for transforming norms can be identified, and where those
transformations in norms have had a demonstrable effect on the precipitation or prolongation
of large-scale wrongs, then it may be appropriate to hold individuals involved in designing or
implementing such mechanisms morally responsible for doing so.
Two examples will clarify the range and limits of this principle. The first, already referred to
above, is the development of a coded language for describing the torture and killing of the disabled,
Jews, political prisoners, and other persecuted groups under National Socialism. The second is the
profusion of hate propaganda that commonly accompanies large-scale wrongs.
Each of these mechanisms has been identified as contributing to what James Waller calls “a
culture of cruelty that helps [perpetrators] initiate, sustain, and cope with their extraordinary
evil.”74 If such assessments are accurate, then it seems appropriate to hold individuals responsible
for developing and deploying such mechanisms. Localizing responsibility for changes in norms
in this way does not absolve other individuals of responsible from particular wrongful acts, such
as killing, torture, or theft. Instead, it introduces a new layer of responsibility specifically aimed at
addressing the specific wrong of transforming the normative landscape. In assessing responsibility
for such norm transformations, standard criteria for moral responsibility, including intent,
knowledge, and ability to actually accomplish the transformations contemplated, will need to be
considered. But there is no reason to think that these criteria pose greater barriers to attributions of
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moral responsibility for instigating norm transformations than they do for assessing responsibility
for other kinds of contributions to mass atrocities.75
Importantly, this principle pushes for the localization of moral, rather than legal,
responsibility for norm transformations. It is unlikely that international courts or tribunals would
ever countenance a crime of transforming the normative landscape as such – though certain
mechanisms for doing so (such as the spread of hate propaganda) have been criminalized in
international law.76 In part, this is because of the different epistemologies, or ways of knowing
and proving, employed by law and by other moral and historical discourses.77 In part, this is
because courts and justice systems simply are not designed to deal with the problem of assigning
responsibility in cases where infractions are normal, rather than exceptional, as the next section
will suggest.
Rethinking Localization of Legal Responsibility
A second evaluative implication of the thesis of norm transformation can be framed in the form of a
critique of current practices of localizing legal responsibility for mass atrocity. This critique builds
on historian Christian Gerlach’s doubts about the explanatory value of the concept of genocide.78
Gerlach contends that thinking about mass violence in terms of genocide undermines, rather
than enriches, historical understanding. More specifically, he argues that “genocide is an actionoriented model designed for moral condemnation, prevention, intervention, or punishment,”
which unduly “restricts the analysis” of large-scale violence.79 Gerlach’s positive project is to show
that mass violence is more pluralistic in its targets and perpetrators, more complex in its planning
and execution, than genocide-oriented studies acknowledge.80
Gerlach’s analysis of the complex causes of mass violence embraces the thesis of norm
transformation. In extremely violent societies, he observes, “ethical norms and values are
devalidated not only among persecutors or profiteers, but also among the vulnerable groups. This
leads to atomization, betrayal, corruption, opportunism, ignorance, and cruelty.”81 What is novel is
Gerlach’s emphasis on cross-cutting breakdowns in norms governing social, political, and religious
life.
This way of understanding mass violence, with its emphasis on “social processes that can only
partially be controlled by any government,” runs counter to efforts to localize legal responsibility
within a relatively small group of governmental actors.82 As explained above, one criterion for the
legitimacy of any effort to localize responsibility is the vesting of control over events in particular
individuals. This is just what the notion of extremely violent societies denies.
Gerlach suggests that the concept of genocide itself localizes legal responsibility for largescale crimes in ways that may be justified on instrumental, though not historiographical, grounds.
“Punishment has to be limited,” he writes. “To admit that all sorts of groups, organizations and
individuals participated in mass violence runs counter to the attempt to restore social peace and to
find values based on which society may live together in [the] future.”83
If the general analytical framework of this paper is correct, then Gerlach’s perspective on
the relationship between of historical analysis and policies aimed at prevention or punishment
seems too pessimistic. These different undertakings can and should inform each other; challenges
encountered in the course of the one endeavor should prompt revisions in approaches to the other.
Legal scholar Mark Drumbl argues to this effect in his book Atrocity, Punishment, and International
Law.84 There, Drumbl suggests that the model of individual criminal responsibility, grounded in
assumptions about the prosecution of socially deviant action, is ill fitted to cases of mass atrocity
characterized by widespread societal participation and support. He proposes a more pluralist
approach to attributions of legal responsibility, one that accommodates a variety of democratically
responsive forms of criminal and civil proceedings.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess Drumbl’s specific policy suggestions. One
takeaway from his analysis, however, is that localization of legal responsibility for mass atrocities
in a small group of leading actors can be as problematic from a legal perspective as it is distortive
from a historiographical point of view. That is a finding that coincides with this paper’s basic claim
that explanatory, preventive, and evaluative applications of the thesis of norm transformation are,
in principle, compatible.
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Conclusion
The thesis of norm transformation is powerful and provocative. It provokes by asking us to
acknowledge the mutability of the basic norms that structure political societies—including our
own societies. In return, it offers a powerful framework for making sense of crimes that strain
comprehension and defy censure.
The thesis of norm transformation does not compel a choice between explanatory, preventive,
and evaluative priorities in the face of mass atrocity. Instead, it posits a fundamental continuity
between these different aims. It suggests that they are not just compatible, but may even be
complementary.
Important questions remain about how the thesis of norm transformation should be applied
with respect to particular episodes of genocide and mass atrocity. Some of these questions are
historiographical. Others concern institutional design. Still others are legal or moral. Rather
than seeking to settle these questions, this paper has clarified, defended, and extended the set
of concepts on which scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds can draw when pursuing
answers. Ultimately, Raphael Lemkin’s observation concerning genocide applies to large-scale
crimes more generally: “the examination of the problem is not limited to one branch of science, but
claims the support of many.”85
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